THE "SAVE RHODESIA
CAMPAIGN" - WHY IT FAILED
At the beginning
of 1977 the Rhodesian nation was facing its darkest hour ever. The destruction
of the country had apparently been time-tabled by the cunning machinations of
Henry Kissinger and, more worryingly, Ian Smith was being pressurised to
surrender by South African Prime Minister John Vorster. To those in the know,
however, the situation was far more complex than this; Ian Smith had been
slowly jettisoning the stronger members of his original UDI Cabinet almost from the
very day that he had declared Rhodesian independence, and was now apparently
eager for a "settlement" (a euphemism for a sell-out) at any price.
The malleable Vorster, seeing that there was apparently declining determination
to carry on resistance within the Rhodesian Cabinet, washed his hands of the
whole matter and left Rhodesia to its fate - this in spite of the fact that the
fall of Rhodesia would present severe security problems for South Africa
itself, which was subsequently so well confirmed and illustrated.
To the average
non-politically-aware Rhodesian it therefore appeared as if they didn't have a
friend in the outside world; even their trusted Southern neighbour now seemed
to be turning their back on them. This was not the case however. The
overwhelming majority of Whites in South Africa stood four-square behind
the Rhodesian nation in their fight for survival. Furthermore, there was a
highly significant pool of support at grass-roots level elsewhere throughout
the Western world.
Many political
observers in South Africa became aware of this
situation, and realised that it was essential for the survival of the Rhodesian
nation, and ultimately of South Africa also, to increase the
will of the Rhodesian people to resist. In order to do this it was vital to
convince them a) that they did not stand alone, and indeed had significant
grass-roots support not only in South Africa, but throughout the Western world,
and b) that the Rhodesian Front Government of "Good Old
Smithy" was in actual fact becoming weaker and weaker as a result of
pressure from Vorster, and indeed was preparing to surrender the Rhodesian
nation, so therefore must be replaced at the earliest possible opportunity by a
stronger government, as was already waiting in the wings in the form of the Rhodesian
Action Party [RAP].
There were, of
course, already at this time a number of pro-Rhodesian organisations in South Africa, including the
Cape-based Friends of Rhodesia and the South Africa-Rhodesia
Association [SARA] of Mrs. M.V. Maxwell and Mrs. Eve Brierley.
Both these bodies, however, were essentially nothing more than comfort-fund
organisations, which merely collected funds to provide materials and gifts for
Rhodesian troops etc., and in no way could be considered as racial-nationalist
in motivation - nor even "political" in the widest context.
It was against
this background that the Save Rhodesia Campaign was founded on May 20th 1977 by four members of the Cape Town Chapter of Ivor Benson's National Forum organisation, Stanley
Deane, Bernie Foyle, David Overton and Brendan Willmer.
Although still fully in agreement with the basic ideology of Ivor Benson and the National Forum, these four
realised that something more active than the National Forum's mere
"talk-shop" approach was now essential at this most important
juncture in Southern African history, when the very existence of the Rhodesian
nation was at stake. At the same time, however, the existing pro-Rhodesian
"comfort-fund" organisations did not provide the answer; as they
concentrated on the mere material needs of the Rhodesian nation. What was now
vitally required was a pro-Rhodesian organisation in South Africa which was prepared to
fight the psycho-political battle. This was the very raison d'ˆtre
for the foundation of the Save Rhodesia Campaign.
Although the
motivations behind the foundation of the SRC were therefore faultless, and
although the organisation was expertly and professionally established, within
just a few weeks of its launch the seeds were sewn which were to lead not only
to its own eventual impotency, but also, as a result of this, to the complete
failure of its ultimate aims. No sooner had the SRC been founded and was
starting to gain publicity and to make progress than a "palace coup"
was staged by Brendan Willmer, ably assisted by David
Overton (something which he later came to regret greatly), and both Stanley
Deane and Bernie Foyle were ousted from the organisation.
Willmer was a highly suspicious character. A British citizen, it was
subsequently discovered (shortly prior to his deportation from South Africa in
1984) that during his previous 13 years in the country he had never attempted
to gain South African Citizenship - nor even permanent residence! He had been involved
in neo-Nazi and Hitler-cultist organisations in the U.K. during his early teens,
when he even dropped out of school early so as to become more active. He
subsequently joined the British National Front in 1969 and, through his
unquestionable organisational ability, quickly managed to work his way up
through his Leicester party branch. In 1971, however, he was forced to
leave the organisation following a number of unsubstantiated, though widely
believed, allegations concerning sexual and financial misdemeanours. He
subsequently emigrated to South Africa where he was completely
politically inactive until he joined the National Forum shortly prior to
the launch of the SRC.
Once he had
ousted Deane and Foyle and seized dictatorial control of the SRC Willmer immediately started to distance the organisation
from its natural power-base in South Africa, namely the existing
racial-nationalist and patriotic bodies in the country. The National Forum
had initially been "plugging" the SRC at its meetings and in its
journal Behind the News, but Willmer sent an
arrogant and insulting letter to Ivor Benson's wife
Joan instructing them to cease this support as he did not want to be associated
with "extremist organisations". When it was revealed that the wife of
the founding Leader of the HNP, Albert Hertzog, had joined the SRC Willmer likewise wrote to her and asked her to resign. All
officials of the SRC were similarly instructed to sever all connections with
the HNP, the National Forum and the embryo National Front of South
Africa, a body which Willmer conducted a
particularly childish vendetta campaign against, probably because of his
earlier experiences with its U.K. parent organisation.
Willmer also started to pursue a personality cult within the SRC. His name would
appear with regular monotony on almost every piece of literature and press
release emanating from the Campaign offices. Although he had managed to retain
control of the Western Cape Region of the SRC, the Transvaal Region had
remained loyal to Deane and Foyle. Willmer's superior
organising ability managed to "rectify" this situation within a few
months however, and by using his only real supporter in the Transvaal at the
time, James Sives, Willmer
was able to gain control of the region's main asset, the SRC Office in
Johannesburg. In spite of having no support to man this office he continued to
retain possession for over 12 months, paying the rental etc. for the
"white elephant" regularly from Cape Town simply in order to deny
access to his opponents. In January 1978 Willmer
issued a "Transvaal Interim Newsletter" from Cape Town (complete with
a nauseating picture of his own self-righteous face on the front page) which
was sent to all SRC supporters in the Province, the result of which being that
the Campaign in the Transvaal became hopelessly divided and withered into
impotency. Indeed, apart from a branch of the organisation set-up by James Sives's brother in Pietersburg, the only place in the
country outside the Western Cape which maintained an
active branch was Durban, where the local
Chairman, Duncan du Bois, was a youthful and initially unquestioning Willmer yes-man.
Having gone out
of his way to alienate support from the organisation's natural power-base, the
existing patriotic political movements in South Africa, and having also
antagonised the pro-Rhodesian "comfort fund" organisations (bodies
with whom the SRC could have and should have co-operated closely) by treading
on their toes and trying to upstage them, Willmer
then attempted (predictably unsuccessfully) to court the favour of the National
Party hierarchy and other facets of the South African establishment. He
built up a mysteriously close working relationship with John Wiley, then the
leader of the small centrist South African Party. Wiley was prepared to
chair several SRC meetings in the Western Cape, and even attended a
number of the Campaign's fund-raising dances, where he was evidently a
spectacular performer on the dance-floor! (Wiley subsequently
crossed the floor to the NP and gained a Cabinet post therein, before
committing suicide in 1987, amidst wildly unproven press allegations of
homosexual involvement). Willmer also induced
a number of mainstream conservative speakers from the United States to appear on SRC
platforms, the most bizarre of whom being Ralph Moss, an articulate
pro-Rhodesian negro homosexual. Not surprisingly the
presence of this "Queen of Spades" on the SRC platform drove away
even more supporters from the organisation. It is uncertain precisely through
which circles Willmer made contact with Moss; Willmer most certainly was not a negro!
On November 12th 1977 (less than 6 months after the foundation of the
organisation) a most extraordinary meeting took place in Cape Town, attended by Willmer, Overton, du Bois (specially flown down from Durban - entirely on SRC
expenses!) and a shadowy young student from the University of Cape Town. Although Rhodesia was
still in existence, and indeed was facing the most critical moment in its
history ever, it was decided to launch a "sister campaign" to the SRC
to be known as the South Africa First Campaign, which was to concentrate
on internal South African matters. In the months which were to follow, when the
need for the tactics which motivated the original foundation of the SRC was greater
than ever, the Campaign's time and resources were thus divided between the two
"sister" organisations, much to the detriment of the Rhodesian cause,
which had been the very motivation behind the formation of the movement in the
first place. Although there has never been any hard concrete proof to confirm
it, the circumstantial evidence would certainly suggest that the SAFC was a Department of
Information funded front-organisation, set-up be the powers-that-be once they
had become aware of the efficiency and effectiveness of the SRC. The SAFC was
founded before the "Info. bubble" burst and
initially had money to burn (as du Bois's flight to Cape Town and the move to new
plusher Campaign offices in the city well illustrated), yet once the entire
"Info. scandal" was exposed the money
suddenly dried up. The Campaign regularly marketed literature supplied by Valiant
Books - later exposed as a Department of Information front - at their
meetings. Years later, when attempting to make a disastrously unsuccessful
political "come-back" in Durban, Willmer
was also to renew what appeared to be a long-standing political relationship
with "Info. rogue" Connie Mulder.
In September
1978, with the vital Rhodesian Constitutional Referendum having been set for
the following January, Willmer was to make an
official speaking tour of Rhodesia on behalf of the SRC.
The purpose of this trip was apparently to fulfil the original raison-d'ˆtre of the Campaign and to canvass, on behalf of White
South Africans, for a massive "No" vote in this Referendum.
Rhodesians, it was thought, were to be informed that they did not stand alone,
that White patriots in South Africa - free from Rhodesian
censorship - could see that the current Rhodesian Front government was
now preparing to sell-out their nation, and therefore had to be swept from
power by means of a massive rejection of the Referendum Proposals. What
transpired, however, as was witnessed by this present writer who accompanied Willmer during the second half of his trip, was a complete
disappointment. Rather than argue for a "No" vote Willmer
spent most of the time during his speeches performing little more than a PR
exercise for the SRC itself (during which he would even try to claim credit for
the SRC for projects initiated by the various pro-Rhodesian comfort-fund
organisations in South Africa, incredibly even including the Cavalry horses
donated to the Grey Scouts Regiment by students from the University of
Pretoria!); when he did touch the subject of the Referendum, however, his message
was most ambiguous - to say the least. Most of the audiences who attended his
meetings came away confused as to what his message actually was, with some even
weirdly believing that he was advocating a "Yes" vote! When
questioned about this lack of clarification concerning the Referendum issue by
this present writer, Willmer replied that the SRC
could not afford to be seen as "interfering" in the internal affairs
of a foreign state, and that if he was seen to be so doing then he would
quickly be deported back to South Africa. One has to ask, however, what the
original purpose of the SRC was if it was not to "interfere" in the
internal affairs of a foreign state, as its very name implied, and moreover
what could possibly be the moral justification for making a tour of the country
completely on Campaign expenses if it was not to fulfil the basic objectives of
the organisation! Furthermore, it could also be argued that the deportation of
the SRC National Director would result in the greatest possible propaganda coup
that the "No" Campaign and the SRC itself could ever obtain. (Years
later it was discovered why Willmer so much feared
the possibility of deportation: he was still a U.K. citizen travelling on a
British Passport!).
Once back in
South Africa Willmer was pressurised by the remaining
hard-line members of the organisation (including this present writer), and
belatedly even by du Bois also, to adopt a far more positive stance as far as
advocating a "No" vote was concerned. Dr. Colin Barlow, a leading
official of the RAP, was at that time touring South Africa in order to gain support
and publicity for the Party and their federal-solution approach, and Willmer was persuaded, somewhat reluctantly, to give him
the speaking-platform of the SRC for his tour of the country. Although this tour was far lower-key than most of the previous ones
undertaken by the SRC the result was quite dramatic - unfortunately to the
detriment of the Barlow tour and the SRC as an organisation. Barlow
unashamedly took an anti-Smith stance and openly advocated a "No"
vote - clearly much to the embarrassment of Willmer.
The outcome was not only that critical letters concerning the SRC were written
to the establishment press from politically naive pro-RF elements in the
predominantly Rhodesian audiences, but also, incredibly, that several leading
office bearers in the SRC resigned from their posts, quoting as their reasons
that the Campaign had "gone political". Amongst these turncoats were
John and Judy Campbell-Corder, the mainstays of the
Somerset West Branch of the organisation almost from day one, and Janet Hale, a
Durban Branch committee member and girl-friend of the Branch Photographer David
Dodds (who subsequently represented South Africa at
clay-pigeon shooting in the Commonwealth Games), who had been introduced into
the Campaign by the pro-du Bois Branch Secretary and Office Manageress Suzanne
Smith. Needless to say these high-profile resignations were given great
prominence by the establishment press, much to the detriment of the belated
"pro-No" stance taken by the SRC. The fact that the Campaign had by
its very nature been "political" since its initial formation, and had
always had as one of its basic founding principles the policy of opposing any
betrayal of the Rhodesian nation, when coupled to the fact that such
astonishingly naive and ignorant individuals managed to obtain - and then
retain - such highly-placed positions within the organisation, is a frightening
condemnation of those in top control of the SRC.
The climax of
the Campaign's existence, indeed the fulfilment of the very raison d'ˆtre for the SRC, came with the Rhodesian Constitutional
Referendum of 30th January 1979. For weeks previously
Campaign supporters both in the Western Cape and in Natal had been feverishly
addressing envelopes which were to be sent to the entire Rhodesian Electorate
advocating a "No" vote on behalf of the SRC, and indeed the White
South African people as a whole. This had been a long-planned tactic of the SRC
in the event of a Constitutional Referendum being called, and was of course to
be the final make-or-break vindication of the Campaign's existence. This
objective of the SRC, however, was sabotaged by three separate incidents, all
of which were purely the work of Willmer, and all of
which totally ruined the basic aim. Firstly Willmer
insisted that names and addresses were taken from the Rhodesian Telephone
Directory rather than from the Voters Roll (which could easily be obtained from
RAP contacts within the country) as it would be "more up to date".
The fact that was ignored, of course, was that the telephone directory would
contain a sizeable percentage of names who were not electors (Non-Whites
included!) and yet many citizens who were on the Voters Roll might not be on
the 'phone. The second disaster which befell the mass-circulation campaign was
the fact that although it was intended to keep the entire exercise an absolute
secret (and indeed supporters who were involved in the operation were
instructed to keep absolutely silent about the precise details by Willmer), a few days before the mass-mailing was to take
place the great "National Director" of the Campaign blurted out
details of the whole exercise to the South African press. The result, needless
to say, was that the authorities both in South Africa and in Rhodesia were alerted in advance,
and, as subsequent events were to prove, the vast majority of mailings were
intercepted by the various postal authorities. The final disaster came to light
when the Willmer-authored broadsheet which was to be
sent to the Rhodesian electorate advocating a "No" vote was
published. Just like his speaking tour of Rhodesia this leaflet did not spell
out in detail that the SRC was opposing the new multi-racial Constitution
Proposals, and indeed was extremely ambiguous and wishy-washy in this respect
(evidently because Willmer once more did not want to
be seen as offending the RF Government!). It was full of mere platitudes, with
the back of the sheet containing the inevitable montage "plugs" for
the SRC as an organisation. Even the date of the Referendum was incorrectly
given! These foolish mistakes made by a one-man dictator turned the entire
exercise into a disaster, and all the hard work put into the operation by
supporters of the Campaign and the Rhodesian cause over the previous few months
therefore came to nothing.
Belatedly both
du Bois and this present writer tried to rectify the situation through the
pages of the Rhodesian press, the former by privately-placed advertisements and
the latter by letters to the editors, but it was all too late. The damage had
already been done. Unsurprisingly even these late efforts were disapproved of
by Willmer, and shortly afterwards the final breaks
occurred between him and the two Durban stalwarts, the latter somewhat sooner
than the former. In retrospect these breaks should have been made much earlier,
but the vital urgency of the Rhodesian struggle made it essential to continue
working through an established organisation, rather than attempting to set-up something
new.
The rest is
history. On 30th January 1979, no doubt under the illusion that they stood
alone and without a friend in the outside world, the Rhodesian people, by an
incredible 85.4% of the vote cast, voted for voluntary national euthanasia. The
Rhodesian nation was dead. Although Willmer continued
to capitalise upon the emotive term "Rhodesia" in the Western Cape for some while
thereafter in order to boost SAFC funds, the Durban Branch
of the SRC disbanded the following day.
As can be seen, therefore,
although the original founding principles of the SRC were faultless, and in all
probability could have proved successful if fully adhered to, the failure of
the leadership of the Campaign, or more precisely of one man, to carry out the
plans and tactics of the organisation as originally constituted proved to be
its very ruination, and turned the entire exercise into something worse than
useless.
Although the
silver tongue and natural organising abilities of Willmer
undoubtedly helped to publicise and gain support for the SRC in certain
respects, his many faults and failings (made worse by his lack of a finalised
formal education) put to naught any benefit which he may have given to the
Campaign, and indeed such failings in a man who had usurped dictatorial control
over the entire organisation meant that it was inevitably doomed to disaster.
If we are to accept that Willmer was sincere in his
beliefs (which is by no means certain, particularly in view of his
counter-productive actions whilst organising the Referendum mass-circulation
operation) then we can only arrive at the conclusion that he was seriously
lacking in both political analysis and strategic judgement.
But everything
could have been so very much different. If the support of the natural
power-base of the SRC, the existing patriotic political groupings in South
Africa, had not been snubbed, if the pro-Rhodesia comfort fund organisations
had not been alienated, if there had been no self-defeating attempts to court
the favour of polite establishment circles, such as from Wiley and the
Campbell-Corders etc., if a totally unambiguous
"Vote No" campaign had been conducted, then the Rhodesian people
would undoubtedly have realised that they did not stand alone and that a
significant body of White society in South Africa (and indeed around the
Western world) wished them to carry on the struggle. They then might well have
rejected the sell-out RF Government and not have voted for national suicide. If
this had been the case then the Vorsterite Government
in South Africa would probably have renewed their support for the Rhodesian
struggle - if only for the self-interest of the South African nation as far as
the security angle was concerned - for it appears that the apparent lack of
resolve on the part of the Rhodesian people was one of the prime reasons why
they washed their hands of them in the first place. It must be remembered in
this context that spirited White resistance in South-West Africa prevented the
final sell-out of that territory by the South African Government for another
decade, and it must also be borne in mind that subsequent electoral gains by
the right-wing parties in South Africa itself caused hasty back-peddling on the
part of the NP Government. If a vibrant and high profile pro-Rhodesian lobby
had been in existence in South Africa in the late 1970's then for electoral
reasons, if for none other, the South African Government could not have
afforded to let Rhodesia fall, particularly if this support was coupled to a
proven resolve amongst the Rhodesian people themselves. If such a state of
affairs had come about, and if the "No" vote had won the
Constitutional Referendum, then the RF administration would have been driven
from power, a genuine and strong-willed Rhodesian government centred on the RAP
would have taken over the reins of power, and, in all likelihood, the Rhodesian
nation would therefore still have been in existence today. If such a situation
had come about then the entire geo-political position of Southern Africa would now
be vastly different, and South Africa's northern borders would thus have been
infinitely more secure.
This scenario
may at first appear to be incredible, but a few important points must be borne
in mind. Firstly the Rhodesian Armed Forces never lost a battle in the
terrorist war - a war, moreover, which could have been WON if it was not for
the RF's apparent no-win-war policy. Secondly
international sanctions had totally failed to destroy the Rhodesian economy,
and indeed the nation had successfully built up its own self-sufficient
economic infrastructure which was the envy, and indeed a potential signpost,
for many vastly larger Western nations. Finally the only battle which Rhodesia
did lose was the psycho-political will of her people to resist - which of
course brings us back to the original raison d'ˆtre
behind the foundation of the SRC, which somehow somewhere along the road became
betrayed.
A decade later,
with Rhodesia destroyed, the jackals of multi-racialism and international
socialism again hovered over Southern Africa, this time with the prize of South
Africa itself in their mind's eye. Once again, alas, we saw the self-appointed
"saviours" of the White Man emerging from nowhere, with full
publicity once more ominously given to them by the establishment press. This
time, however, they were noted more for their loud mouths and neo-Nazi
uniforms, rather than for the silver tongue and suave suits which typified Willmer, but their lack of any academic qualifications or
of any popularly elected position remained the same - as also was their refusal
to co-operate with anyone else. The Whites of South Africa unbelievably made
exactly the same mistake. They chose to worship insects.